A New Look at the General Counsel's Unreviewable Discretion Not to Issue a Complaint under the NLRA* Jonathan B. Rosenblumt
With the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, Congress created the office of General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).' Section 3(d) of the Act gives the General Counsel "final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints [regarding unfair labor practices], and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the Board ....
-2 Though this innovation may have appeared inconsequential in comparison with the great substantive changes that the Taft-Hartley Act wrought in American labor law, § 3(d) has been of major significance for both the development and administration of national labor policy. Shortly after his office was created, Robert Denham, the first General Counsel, described his powers as "broad and absolute" and his authority "final to an outstanding degree seldom accorded a single officer in a peacetime agency." 3 Denham's appraisal assumed that no court could review the General Counsel's decision not to issue a complaint. Courts have generally refused to do so.4 Instead of analyzing the General Counsel's un-reviewable discretion, commentators have cited it as an established part of our administrative law. 5 This article contends that this unreviewable discretion has impaired achievement of the goals of national labor policy and is inconsistent with prevailing administrative law doctrines. Part I examines the history of the General Counsel's office and demonstrates the absence of any clear congressional intent regarding reviewability. 6 Part II argues that the General Counsel's independence of both Board and courts undermines the rights of charging parties and impedes the evolution of national labor policy by allowing low-visibility, unreviewed interpretations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
Judicial review of the General Counsel's failure to issue an unfair labor practice complaint would enhance the apparent and actual fairness of the General Counsel's decisions and would stimulate more vigorous exploration and enforcement of the rights afforded by the NLRA. Part III examines the reasons courts have advanced in refusing to review the General Counsel's decision not to issue a complaint. The cursory manner in which the courts have treated the relevant administrative law issues suggests their strong underlying conviction that Congress meant to preclude review. In light of the conclusion of Part I that Congress's intent with respect to review is unclear, the courts' legal arguments against judicial review are found wanting. Part IV outlines the form that judicial review should take. The proper scope of review is dictated by the dual purpose it must serve: to protect private parties from arbitrary treatment of their complaints and to ensure that new and important questions requiring interpretation of the NLRA are settled initially by the Board and ultimately by the courts reviewing Board decisions. (1968) ; United Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Ordman, 366 F.2d 776 (2d Cir. 1966) (per curiam), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967) ; Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 295 F.2d 526 (3d Cir. 1961 L. REV. 786, 787-88 (1965) . But see McClintock, The Unreviewable Power of the General Counsel-Partial Enforcement of the Labor Act, 12 GONZ. L. REV. 79 (1976) (arguing for judicial review of General Counsel's refusals to issue unfair labor practice complaints).
6. Congressional intent in this context refers not only to specific views on judicial review, but also to the policies meant to be served by § 3(d) . In the absence of a clear legislative intent to preclude review, courts will consider whether such review is consistent with the statutory scheme and purposes. See, e.g., Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 , 1249 -51 (1st Cir. 1970 . See generally Saferstein, supra note 5, at 371, 377. the establishment of an independent Administrator who would perform the investigative and prosecutorial functions under the Act."
By 1937 the Board itself had realized the need for increased separation of its adjudicatory and prosecutorial functions. Under the procedures that emerged, the Board rarely had any direct involvement in a case before hearing its merits, yet retained some control over the questions it decided. If a Regional Director determined that a complaint should issue, he sought approval from the Administrative Examiners Division in Washington. Only in a particularly difficult or novel case did the Director of that Division consult the Board. Once approval from Washington had been obtained, the Regional Office drafted the complaint.
12 By 1942 the decision to issue a complaint had been totally delegated to the Regional Offices, so long as the case presented no issues of policy or novel questions of law or fact over which the Regional Director and the Regional Attorney disagreed.
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A dissatisfied complainant could appeal the Regional Office's decision to the Appeals and Review Committee in Washington, which then made recommendations to the Board." Through this internal separation of functions, the NLRB complied with the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) even before its enactment.' 3 had been appointed even before the complaint was issued. Id. at 46. The Committee found that in Berkshire Knitting Mills, 17 N.L.R.B. 239, 5 L.R.R. M. 305 (1939) , the Board had manifested a continuing readiness to proceed with charges and had ordered an investigation of possible violations even before charges were filed by the union. Once charges were filed, the Board delayed issuance of the complaint for nine months at the request of the union, which was considering a strike. SMITH CONIM. REPORT REv. 901, 911 (1941) .
13. H. MILLIS & E. BROWN, supra note 9, at 55. In the rare instance where the Regional Office sought advice on investigative or trial matters, a special committee was convened to provide it. None of the committee members was allowed to assist the Board in the ultimate resolution of the case. Amendments to tile National Labor Relations Act: Hearings on H. R. 8, H.R. 725, H.R. 880, H.R. 1095, and H.R. 1096 Before the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3158, 3189 (1947) (statement of NLRB Chairman Paul A. Herzog).
14. Members of the Committee could not subsequently adiise the Board on the decisions in the particular case or related ones. H. MILLIS & E. BROwN, supra note 9, at 64. Procedure .-let, 33 A.B.A. J. 14, 14, 16 (1947) . Those who participated in the decision to initiate cases were isolated in every way possible from the adjudicatory stage. Review Section attorne)s, who analyzed the Trial Examiner's findings and drafted opinions, were forbidden to examine office files from the investigative stage of the proceedings. Trial Examiners were set apart as an autonomous unit of the Board. Klaus, The Taft-Hartley Experiment in Separation of NLRB Functions, 11 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 371, 373-74 (1958) .
Findling, NLRB Procedures: Effects of the Administrative
These requirements conform to those in APA § 5(d), 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970) . Section 554(d)(2) provides that an employee who presides at the reception of e idence or who
B. Legislative Intent and the Enactment of § 3(d)
In 1947 Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act; § 3(d) of that Act created the General Counsel's office and thereby established a formal separation of functions for unfair labor practice cases. 1 ' During congressional debates both proponents and opponents of the idea of a separate official to bring complaints concentrated their attention on whether the existing internal separation of functions adequately protected the due process rights of parties before the Board. No attention was given to the issue of judicial review.
The provision that emerged from conference as § 3(d) was essentially the House proposal.
1 7 The House documents, therefore, are significant in determining congressional intent with respect to judicial review. The original House version of the Taft-Hartley Act revived the Smith Committee's recommendation of an independent Administrator whose duty it would be "to investigate charges of unfair labor practices, to issue complaints if he has reasonable cause to believe such charges are true, to prosecute such complaints before the Board, to make application to the courts for enforcement of orders of the Board, [and] to investigate representation petitions and conduct [representation] elections ...... iS The accompanying House Report provides some support for the view that limited judicial review of the General Counsel's decisions was contemplated. The Report describes the Administrator as having discretion not to issue a complaint "only when the facts the complainant alleges do not constitute an unfair practice, or when the complainant clearly cannot prove his claim."' 19 Such a makes the initial decision in a case may not "be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency." Similarly, any employee engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecutorial functions for an agency in a case "may not, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to [ § 557 ], except as witness or counsel in public proceedings." Id. President Truman also called attention to the General Counsel's broad discretion under the Taft-Hartley Act. In explaining to Congress his veto of the Act, he pointed out that under § 3(d) the General Counsel could usurp the NLRB's policymaking functions by deciding which cases the Board would hear. 20 But the relevance of judicial review to this possible weakness of a bifurcated structure was not discussed. Senator George, the only senatorial supporter of the TaftHartley Act to address himself specifically to this part of President Truman's veto message, simply revived the old charge that the Board lacked all pretense of fairness in its desire to put a CIO union in every plant. 2 7 The important point highlighted by Senator George's remark is that supporters of § 3(d) paid scant attention to possible injustices arising from a failure to prosecute. The perceived evil at which the office of General Counsel was aimed was the overzealousness of the old Board-too many prosecutions, not too few. 28 The evidence that most strongly suggests a congressional intent to 25. This last interpretation is the most probable one, as Senator Taft went on to compare the General Counsel with the Attorney General, whose decision whether to prosecute is usually thought to be unreviewable. 7485, 7486-87 (1947) . Proponents of the Taft-Hartley Act apparently did not appreciate that the powers delegated to the General Counsel gave him a significant policymaking capacity. See Comment, The Proper Separation of Functions for Administering Our National Labor Relations Program, 46 ILL. L. REv. 465, 469 (1951) .
Section 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970)
27. 93 CONG. REc. 7537-38 (1947) (Sen. George). However, Senator George seemed to assume that the General Counsel's powers would be limited:
Under [the Taft-Hartley Act] the Board is judicial. It is judicial today. Its counsel will be a prosecutor. He will not have any extraordinary powers-nothing like the power of the Attorney General of the United States, who decides whether criminal actions shall be brought against anyone in the United States. Under this bill, the counsel will have the right to make the decision as between employer and employee; but his decision will be subject to the judicial decision of the Board and, above the Board, the courts; and we have given the courts greater power to look into the decisions of the Board and to provide for the redress of any injustice. Id. at 7538.
28. Hostility to the Board was completely consistent with a favorable attitude to judicial review. See note 27 supra. Indeed, proponents of the Taft-Hartley Act favored judicial review as a check on Board abuses. For example, § 10(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970) , vhich entrusts courts to determine whether the Board's findings of fact are supported by "substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole," anticipated a more active role for the courts than had the Wagner Act. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) .
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The Yale Law Journal U.S. 9 (1943) , flatly posed the question whether the Board's discretion not to issue a complaint was reviewable. In each case a complaint already had issued. The courts simply contrasted the degree of the Board's discretion prior to the issuance of a complaint to its discretion once a complaint did issue.
A plausible, if hypothetical, argument can be constructed to show that thelc was judicial review under the Wagner Act of the Board's refusal to issue a complaint. One of the questions that arose shortly after the enactment of Taft-Hartley was whether the Board could decline jurisdiction of a case in which the General Counsel had issued a complaint and over which the Board undoubtedly had jurisdiction. Courts considering this question held that the Board could decline jurisdiction when in its expert opinion the assertion of jurisdiction would not serve the purposes of the Act. This holding was based on the belief that the same policy considerations that had necessitated the Board's wide discretion in the issuance of complaints under the Wagner Act operated to give it wide discretion in declining jurisdiction under the Taft-Hartley Act. See Haleston Drug Stores v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951) . Yet the Board's refusal to exercise jurisdiction on policy grounds is reviewable. See Hotel Employees Local 255 v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99 (1958) (NLRB cannot refuse to exercise jurisdiction over entire hotel industry); Office Employees Local 11 v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313, 318-20 (1957) (NLRB cannot refuse to exercise jurisdiction over labor unions, as a class, when acting as employers); Joliet Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 193 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1952 ) (NLRB improperly dismissed complaint on grounds that boycotted businesses were essentially local in nature). Since the Board's power to decline jurisdiction is premised on the same view of administrative discretion that underpinned the Board's power not to issue a complaint under the Wagner Act, perhaps the latter power was reviewable as well. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 360-61 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
JUDICIAL CONTROL].
Most importantly, policy arguments against review that might have influenced Congress when enacting the Wagner Act were less compelling under the Taft-Hartley Act. Because the Wagner Act had no common law tradition from which to borrow, there was need for a swift enunciation of policy and for an intake of cases best suited to establish that policy. Only centralized control over enforcement proceedings could prevent the agency from being inundated with routine work and free it to stake out the major parameters of the Wagner Act.
32 By divorcing judge from prosecutor, the Taft-Hartley Act removed control over the intake of cases from the body charged with interpreting the new Act. The need for broad discretion over issuance of complaints as a necessary adjunct to effective policymaking was thus removed.
C. Congressional Reconsideration of § 3(d)
Twice in the three years following passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress considered proposals to terminate the separation of functions within the NLRB. Although the accompanying debates demonstrated a clear recognition of the problems § 3(d) had created, the relevance of judicial review to these problems was ignored. The positions taken with respect to the proper separation of functions continued to depend largely on perceptions of the substantive policies followed by the Board and the General Counsel. 33 In 1949 a proposal to end the General Counsel's independent status 34 passed the Senate as part of a bill to revise the Taft-Hartley Act. Senator Taft termed 32. See Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma in Labor Board Cases, 59 HARv. L. REV. 720 (1946) . Professor Jaffe has made perhaps the strongest case for broad administrative discretion in selecting cases for prosecution:
Administrative procedures are peculiarly apt where the standards are general, where there is a need for creating and developing subcategories, where guidance rather than punishment best conform[s] to the novelty and generality of the law. This development should be steady, sensitively responsive to experience and to current demands, . .. in one hackneyed word, integrated. Initially this task may be best performed by a small group capable of exhaustive and continuous discussion and decision. Id. at 728. Although Jaffe's argument is forceful as applied to the newly created Board in 1935, it cannot be applied to the Board today, First, § 3(d) ended the integration of functions that is central to the argument. Second, the present Board is interpreting a thirty-year-old statute and is thus to some extent spared "the novelty and generality of the law" that confronted the Board in 1935. In this situation there is less need to tolerate broad administrative discretion.
33. For example, General Counsel Denham had issued complaints against unions in a series of cases in which the Board later declined jurisdiction. Denham consequently was viewed as pro-management, the avatar of the Taft-Hartley Act. Hence, Senator Taft called the Plan a plot to turn the NLRB into a labor agency. 96 CONG. REc. 6883 (1950) (Sen. Taft).
34. S. 249 § § 101-103, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) , reprinted in S. Rr. No. 99, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 73-79 (1949 private parties against arbitrary or erroneous decisions, 4 6 and ensure that labor policy is made, not by the General Counsel, but by the body to whom Congress has entrusted the task-the NLRB. 4 7 Although judicial review would increase the burdens upon the administrative process and the courts, the costs of review are outweighed by its advantages.
A. Protection of Individual Interests
Charging parties in recent years have frequently criticized the General Counsel and, more prominently, the Regional Offices for being too conservative in filing complaints. This perceived conservatism undermines public confidence in the NLRA, since parties believe they are being denied their statutory rights. Though the NLRB Casehandling Manual provides that "[i]n the infrequent case in which (1) applying all relevant principles, the Region is unable to resolve credibility, and (2) the resolution of the conflict means the difference between dismissal and issuance of complaint, a complaint should be issued," 48s nevertheless, Regional Offices sometimes ignore a complaining individual's evidence, resolve all doubts against him, and refuse to issue a complaint. 4 " Their decisions routinely are upheld by 46. See APA § 10(a), (e), 5 U.S.C. § § 702, 706 (1970) On March 5, 1976, General Counsel Irving promulgated a memorandum which stated that his office intended "'to adhere to the past practice of administratively resolving credibility conflicts only where documentary or other objective evidence is the basis for doing so. If such evidence is not available, the issue of credibility is best resolved through a formal hearing where the testimony of witnesses is subject to cross-examination.'" 1976 NLRB Hearings, supra note 45, at 884 (statement of National Lawyers Guild).
49. See 1976 NLRB Hearings, supra note 45, at 885 (statement of National Lawyers Guild):
Tile experience of Guild member attorneys and our clients is that charges are dismissed regardless of "objective evidence" or "inherent probabilities". Workers bringing charges are consistently disbelieved at the investigatory stage. The cases presented here of unfairly dismissed charges include cases where there is no apparent "objective evidence" beyond witnesses' contradictory testimony; where the circumstantial evidence supporting the charge is ignored; and where workers filing charges without the assistance of attorneys are disregarded in the processing of their charge. The Guild's statement also discussed several cases in which the General Counsel ignored precedent, relevant evidence, and workers' uncorroborated testimony and refused to issue a complaint. See id. at 885-86. For example, in Laborers Local 300 (C.V. Holder, Inc.) (31-CB-1753), the General Counsel resolved a credibility conflict against a hiring hall the General Counsel.5 0 Certain Regional Offices, such as Region 20 (San Francisco), are subject to continual criticism for their conservative posture.r' Charging parties also complain that they are given inadequate explanations for dismissal of their charges; Regional Directors in many cases perfunctorily cite "insufficient evidence.
' 5 1 2 A general indication of charging party dissatisfaction with the General Counsel's disposition of charges is the recent growth in the number of suits seeking judicial review of his decisions. 5 3 Despite the discriminatee, even though doubt as to the union's credibility had prompted him to issue a complaint based on similar charges filed by other members of the same union in a companion case (31-CB-1496 (31-CB- , 1725 ; id. at 308-09 (Region 20 prone to refuse to issue complaints on grounds of "insufficient evidence"); id. at 309-10 (General Counsel overruled Region 20 and decided to bring complaint but, after reconsideration and pressure from company lawyers, rescinded decision, without chance for union charging party to confront employer's evidence); id. at 326 ("[The General Counsel and regional offices refuse to issue complaints against employers far too frequently and often fail to follow precedent calling for such issuance of complaints.") But see id. at 458-90 (statement of John Irving, NLRB General Counsel) (defending Regional Offices in San Francisco and Los Angeles against allegations of delay and unfairness to union charging parties).
52. See, e.g., id. at 408, 410, 413, have increasingly sought judicial relief. The suits suggest exasperation with the General Counsel's procedures, which allow charging parties no formal opportunity to rebut opposing evidence or refute opposing arguments.t 5 The cases indicate the need for a meaningful judicial hearing to assure full recognition of charging parties' rights.
Perhaps in response to this need, a few courts have evinced some restiveness with the presumed nonreviewability of the General Counsel's refusal to issue complaints.5 0 Courts have also shown greater reluctance to leave other important decisions affecting the rights of charging parties unreviewed. A number of courts have granted review of the General Counsel's decision to settle cases informally after a complaint has been issued.5 7 In so doing, the courts have recognized the charging party's legal interest, his right to judicial scrutiny of the General Counsel's reasons for terminating a meritorious suit, and the § 101.7 (1976) . Even after a complaint is issued, the Regional Director may withdraw it and accept a settlement, which is not subject to Board approval, see id. § 101.9(b)(2). Neither the Board's regulations nor the NLRB FIELD MANUAL (rev. ed. 1971) provides any guidance as to when an informal, as opposed to formal, settlement is appropriate.
The decision to settle informally terminates the charging party's case without a formal hearing, and is thus quite similar to the refusal to issue a complaint. Indeed, the General Counsel based his claim that informal settlement orders are unreviewable on NLRA § 3(d)-the same section that supports his claim of unreviewable discretion not to issue a complaint. See 29 C.F.R. § 102.18 (1976) . Yet the decision to settle a case informally has been held reviewable. See note 58 infra.
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The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 1349, 1977 necessity of a judicial check against arbitrary or unlawful action by the General Counsel or his agents. 58 In ILGWU Local 59 for example, the D.C. Circuit held that the General Counsel's informal settlement of a case is "final action" of the Board and thus reviewable under NLRA § 10(f), 60 even though the Board never considers the settlement. The court concluded: Section 3(d) invests the General Counsel with broad and "final authority" over the prosecutorial aspects of the Board's administrative process. Yet it is readily apparent that the prosecutorial role may at times blend with the adjudicatory role. Also, even in its most elemental form-for example, the unreviewable decision whether to issue a complaint-the prosecutorial act often might, quite properly, encompass basic policy considerations.'
The court found that the General Counsel's withdrawal of a complaint pursuant to an informal settlement agreement is "essentially adjudicatory" and "cannot meaningfully be distinguished from other types of Board action traditionally held to be within the review provisions of Section 10(f)." 6 2 The Third Circuit has gone even farther and held that once a complaint issues, an informal settlement by the General Counsel is arbitrary and capricious. 6 3 The rationales the courts have cited in reviewing the General Counsel's informal settlements are equally applicable to his decisions not to issue a complaint. Both the formal and informal settlement cases stress the importance of ensuring that the Board fulfill its task as the primary interpreter of national labor policy. Stricter procedural requirements for entry of formal settlement orders are designed to prevent the Board from abdicating its policymaking role through cursory consideration of the issues involved. Judicial review of informal settlement orders encourages formal settlements and placement of ultimate responsibility with the Board. review would benefit the charging party: by giving him a hearing, it would "give the party who feels himself injured and has made a complaint a better chance to have his complaint remedied." 65 Moreover, judicial scrutiny of the General Counsel's decisions may encourage him to be more "vigilant" in issuing complaints and proposing remedies. 6
B. Development of National Labor Policy
Besides determining the statutory rights of individual charging parties, the General Counsel actively shapes labor policy. His interpretation of the Act, whether explicitly enunciated in Advice and Appeals Memoranda 67 and public reports 8 or outlined by his disposition of actual cases, dictates which policy issues the Board will have the chance to consider."" The implications of this authority were recognized soon after passage of the Taft As the person vested with final authority over the issuance of complaints under [the NLRA, as amended by] the Taft-Hartley Act, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board plays a key role in the development of the law under the Act. His approach in deciding whether to issue a complaint in a particular set of circumstances can influence greatly the direction that development will take. See McGuiness, supra note 44, at 387.
Branch found that the General Counsel's discretion gave him virtual rulemaking power in many areas still uncertain under the NLRA. 7 0 Refusal to issue a complaint could preclude the Board and the courts from clarifying some aspect of the substantive law. 7 ' NLRB Chairman Paul Herzog testified that the Board did not even know the kinds of cases in which the General Counsel was refusing to issue complaints; the General Counsel was thus in a position to make definitive interpretations of the Act. Chairman Herzog put it concisely: "He who speaks first, speaks best, for only he may speak at all." 72 Congress, however, intended that the Board decide matters of policy. 73 Indeed, the General Counsel himself has often averred a generalized purpose to authorize complaints "[iun cases presenting substantial or novel issues arising under the legislation, . . so that the Board will have an opportunity to pass on such matters." 74 His performance in this respect may be questioned. Recently, a congressional subcommittee recognized that the General Counsel's unreviewable discretion may impair the development of national labor policy by screening important questions from the Board and reviewing courts. 75 
Certification of Exclusive Bargaining Agent
Another important and unforeseen consequence of the General Counsel's discretion is that it enables him to usurp the Board's exclusive statutory authority to determine the appropriate bargaining unit and to certify the exclusive bargaining representative. 8 7 In many cases the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint will lead to automatic Board inferences regarding representation elections. Two early cases under the Taft-Hartley Act illustrate how the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint can operate indirectly to limit the Board's certification power.
In Kinsman Transit Co., 88 it was charged that an activist union member had been discharged four hours before an election. The Board held that since the General Counsel had declined to bring unfair labor practice charges against the employer, the election must be presumed to have been conducted fairly. In Times Square Stores Corp., 8 9 the question was whether certain striking workers were entitled to vote in a representation election. This determination hinged on whether the workers were economic strikers or unfair labor practice strikers. The Board announced a presumption that strikers are economic strikers unless an unfair labor practice proceeding establishes otherwise. Since the General Counsel had not issued an unfair labor practice complaint against the employer, the Board's presumplegalize such clauses in the construction industry, the Court held that Congress intended to limit the proviso's protection to subcontracting agreements within the context of a collective bargaining relationship and possibly with reference to but a single job site. 
Maintenance-of-Membership Clauses
The General Counsel's inaction has apparently withheld from the Board any consideration of the issue whether a union contract provision requiring membership in good standing is an unfair labor practice when membership entails more than the tendering of dues. Unions cannot enforce such a provision.
9 1 But its presence in the contract may induce workers, who otherwise would only tender dues, to join the union and thereby subject themselves to union discipline.
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Though such a provision has been held to be inherently deceptive and illegal under the Railway Labor Act, 9 3 no complaint has ever been brought under the NLRA.
Employer Discrimination Based on Race or Sex
The General Counsel's unreviewed discretion may restrict the development of national labor policy even where the Board and General Counsel concur in their interpretation of the NLRA. When the Board interprets the NLRA more narrowly than do reviewing courts, the General Counsel can ensure that the Board's view prevails by refusing to issue complaints. For instance, the Board in 1973 held that discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin is not an unfair labor practice unless there is actual evidence of a nexus between the alleged discriminatory conduct and restraint of employees in the 90. The General Counsel had dismissed the unfair labor practice charges because the union had not filed the necessary non-Communist affidavits. The Board's decision thus could not have depended on an assumption that the General Counsel refused to initiate complaints only where there was a lack of evidence. This assumption apparently governed Kinsman Transit Co., 78 N.L.R.B. 78, 81, 22 L.R.R.M. 1165, 1166 (1948 reversed by the D.C. Circuit. 0 1 Despite the evident substantiality of the issue involved and the contrary judicial interpretation, the General Counsel refused to issue any further complaints. 102 Although the Supreme Court ultimately vindicated the Board, 1 0 3 the General Counsel's reluctance to address unsettled questions caused needless delay in the resolution of this central issue of labor policy.
III. Administrative Law: The Misapplication of Relevant Doctrines
The doctrine of nonreviewability is widely accepted, despite the lack of clear congressional intent to preclude review and the important labor law considerations militating in favor of a judicial check on the discretion of the General Counsel. Courts have often resorted to various administrative law doctrines to buttress their assumption of nonreviewability. This reliance is misplaced.
A. The Current State of Judicial Opinion
No court has ever ordered the General Counsel to issue a complaint. Several courts have suggested that there might be cases involving an abuse of discretion 0 4 or a constitutional challenge' 05 in which relief should be granted. But, with only two exceptions,' 0 6 the courts have not found facts warranting a departure from the general pattern of nonreviewability. Although the Supreme Court has never confronted the question directly, the Court has acknowledged, in a number of opinions, the generally accepted doctrine that there is no judicial review of the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint.' 0 The leading Supreme Court decision is Vaca v. Sipes.' 0 s Writing for five Justices, Justice White held that a state court had jurisdiction to adjudicate a member's charge that his union had "arbitrarily [and] capriciously" refused to process his grievance to the fullest extent possible under the collective bargaining agreement. 109 The Court rejected the argument that state court jurisdiction was preempted under the doctrine of San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,"1 0 although the union's alleged actions arguably violated the NLRA. 1 The majority first noted that the prior doctrinal development of the duty of fair representation had been judicial, and for this reason concluded that the issues presented in Vaca were best not left exclusively to the Board." 2 Secondly, the Court feared that to preclude state court jurisdiction might deprive workers injured by discriminatory union conduct of any remedy because of the General Counsel's unreviewable discretion in deciding whether to issue a complaint." 3 Justice White's second ground of decision is not dispositive of the reviewability question. He undertook no analysis; nonreviewability was an assumed premise, treated only in a footnote." 4 Moreover, once Justice White had established that courts are the preferred forum for hearing a union member's charges of discrimination, he had completely answered the preemption argument without implicating reviewability. Indeed, an argument against preemption based upon the General Counsel's unreviewable discretion proves too much, for it is an argument against any application of the preemption doctrine." 5 § § 157, 158 (1970) made protection of the Board's primary jurisdiction unwarranted in Vaca was not that the General Counsel might refuse to issue a complaint when unfair labor practices had plainly occurred. Rather, it was that the Board and the courts had developed so little doctrine under the unfair labor practice provisions of the NLRA to protect union members against inadequate representation that the General Counsel might legitimately refuse to issue a complaint. Even if the General Counsel's decisions were reviewable, therefore, members' remedies before the Board would be insufficient and the argument for state court jurisdiction would remain valid.
B. Administrative Law Doctrines and Judicial Review
The cursory nature of court decisions disposing of challenges to the General Counsel's unbridled discretion can only be traced to a firm conviction that Congress intended to preclude review. But, as Parts I and II of this article have demonstrated, such assumptions about congressional intent are hazardous; indeed, judicial review would advance the goals of national labor policy embodied in the NLRA and its enforcement framework. When courts have attempted to rationalize the doctrine of nonreviewability, they have generally relied on arguments that plaintiffs lack standing because the NLRA does not confer "private rights" but creates only "public rights," or that the General Counsel's decisions are discretionary and therefore unreviewable. These rationalizations are invalid under the tests of standing and reviewability developed by the Supreme Court in the last decade.
Standing
The Supreme Court in 1970 announced a dual test for standing to challenge administrative decisionmaking. Under that test, set out in the companion cases, Association of Data Processing Service Organizaon two independent grounds, which would mandate a different result than that reached by the majority of the Court).
In his opinion in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975), Justice White again alluded to the second ground of decision in Vaca. The Court held in an opinion by Justice White that Appeals and Advice Memoranda in which the General Counsel instructs Regional Directors concerning the issuance of complaints are final agency opinions, since the charging party cannot obtain review of the General Counsel's decisions. Justice White's statement concerning review was unnecessary to his conclusion. Finality, for purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A) (1970), refers only to agency and not to judicial review. The General Counsel's decision is clearly final for agency purposes. 29
U.S.C. § 153(d) (1970).
tions, Inc. v. Camp (ADPSO) 11 and Barlow v. Collins," 7 plaintiffs must allege that the challenged action has caused them "injury in fact" and that the "interest sought to be protected . . . is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."' 1 " The Court perceived the new test as acknowledgment of a trend toward "enlargement of the class of people who may protest administrative action."
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Complainants challenging the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint satisfy both elements of the test. They typically allege that they have been victims of unfair labor practices, the redress of which is made impossible by the General Counsel's inaction. The alleged injuries may be economic, as where a complainant company has been victimized by an illegal boycott, or they may involve the deprivation of rights guaranteed to workers by § 7 of the NLRA.
2 0 Despite recent indications of a narrowed application of the "injury in fact" branch of the test,' 2 ' injuries of this sort are undoubtedly adequate. § 157 (1970) (granting employees the rights, inter alia, to organize, bargain collectively, and engage in other activities for the purpose of "mutual aid or protection," as well as to refrain from such activities). Cases subsequent to ADPSO and Barlow expanded the class of injuries found sufficient to constitute "injury in fact." See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (environmental harms); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 & n.13 (1971) ("injuries other than economic harm are sufficient" to give standing, citing cases) (dictum). The underlying purpose of the NLRA would seem to make cognizable injuries other than traditional economic ones. Because § 7 guarantees workers' rights of self-organization, non-economic harms arising from prohibited employer activity in violation of those rights should be cognizable as "injuries in fact."
121. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (builders' association, association interested in housing problems, and low-income and minority residents of communities adjoining Rochester, N.Y., are without standing to challenge Rochester's allegedly restrictive zoning practices); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976) (low-income individuals denied hospital treatment are without standing to challenge IRS Revenue Ruling altering requirements for classification of hospitals as charitable organizations). To the extent that the Supreme Court in these cases has become more stringent in applying the "injury in fact" requirement, it has undermined SCRAP, in which the majority of the Court, per Justice Stewart, had adopted Professor Davis's position that " 'an identifiable trifle'" is sufficient for standing. 412 U.S. at 689 n.14 (citing Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CH. L. REv. 601, 613 (1968) ).
122. In Warth and Welfare Rights Organization the Court found the relationship between plaintiffs' alleged injury and defendants' alleged wrongs so remote as to The standing of parties to challenge the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint usually turns on a consideration of the second element of the test, the requirement that the right being asserted be within the "zone of interests" protected by the statute. Courts frequently have described the NLRA as protecting only "public rights" or "public interests" and have relied on this finding to support the doctrine of nonreviewability. 123 Courts have thus implicitly analogized the NLRA to criminal statutes and the victim of an unfair labor practice to the victim of a crime. Just as the victim of a crime is said to have no legal interest in a criminal prosecution, the victim of an unfair labor practice is said to have no interest in the remedy of that practice and thus no interest arguably protected by the NLRA.
In general, the dichotomy between statutes that protect the public interest and those that protect private interests lacks analytical content.1 24 The classification of a statute into one or another group may preclude "injury in fact." In Warth, for example, low-income plaintiffs lacked standing because they could show little more than a remote possibility that they would have .been able to obtain the housing they desired even if defendants had not engaged in the challenged zoning practices. 422 U.S. at 504-07. In light of Warth and Welfare Rights Organization, an argument might be made that the injury alleged by a party who has unsuccessfully sought issuance of an unfair labor practice complaint does not amount to "injury in fact." First, the injury results from the actions of union or management, but the relief sought is against the General Counsel. Secondly, even if the party gains the relief it requests-the issuance of a complaint-there is no assurance that the alleged injury will be remedied. 124. The "public interest/private rights" dichotomy developed in the 1930s as a means of circumventing what were perceived to be possible constitutional infirmities in statutes making substantial grants of power to administrative agencies. The idea that an administrative body could grant relief against one party in favor of another was not easily reconciled with traditional learning about the performance of Article III business by non-Article III courts and the right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Agwilines v. NLRB, 87 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1936). But as legal doctrine concerning administrative agencies has grown, the fiction that NLRB proceedings have none of the characteristics of a traditional "case or controversy" between two parties has shown itself not only to be unnecessary, but an impediment to meaningful analysis. In a long line of cases following Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) , it has been held that administrative agencies may adjudicate the liability of one party to another so long as an Article III court is empowered to review questions of law. The perceived infirmity arising from the lack of jury trial is not applicable to NLRB proceedings, for the rights and duties created by the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts do not derive from the common law, and thus their adjudication is not within the ambit of the Seventh Amendment. See Jaffe, The Individual Right to Initiate Administrative Process, 25 IovA L. REv. 485, 528 (1940) .
announce a result in a particular case, but does nothing to explain it.125 True, the NLRA is designed to further the public interest in industrial peace and in the uninhibited flow of commerce, but some public interest underlies every legal rule. -12 6 The question is not whether a statute furthers a public interest but how. The NLRA protects the public interest by creating an elaborate set of duties which labor and management owe to each other; it is predicated on the assumption that the protection of the collective bargaining relationship is in the 'public interest.
1 27 Where particular groups are the obvious beneficiaries of statutorily imposed duties they should have a recognized legal interest in securing adherence to those duties. 2 s Furthermore, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that the NLRA creates private rights. In UAW Local 283 v. Scofield, '" the 125. Cf. Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 500 (1953) ("Whatever purpose a classification of rights as public or private may serve, it is too unsettled and ambiguous to introduce into constitutional law as a dividing line between federal and state power or jurisdiction.") Under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § § 151-188 (1970) , parties injured by a statutory violation can themselves sue in federal court; under the NLRA the Board can act only after the filing of a complaint by the General Counsel. Given the similarities between the duties that the two statutes impose, it confounds common sense to say that one allows private suits, and the other does not, because one protects "private rights" while the other protects "public interests."
126. See Jaffe, supra note 32, at 725 ("The enforcement of contracts is intrinsically no less a matter of public interest than the enforcement of the traffic laiws.') See also UAW Local 283 v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 220 (1965) (" [T] he statutory pattern of the [NLRA] does not dichotomize 'public' as opposed to 'private' interests. Rather, the two interblend in the intricate statutory scheme.") 127. See Jaffe, supra note 124, at 524. The Taft-Hartley Act differs from its predecessor, the Wagner Act, precisely in the mutuality of duties it imposes on unions and employers. The Wagner Act, which imposed duties only on employers, was meant to vindicate a public interest-the spread of unionization and collective bargaining. In contrast, the Taft-Hartley Act sets up the Board as an umpire enforcing rules against both employers and unions. The Report of the Advisory Panel on Labor Management Relations Law on the Organization of the National Labor Relations Board, S. Doc. 81, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1960) 6-7 (1968) . Professor Jaffe has stated the proposition clearly:
It is arguable that presumptively where the law creates duties of which identifiable individuals are the beneficiaries-particularly where the beneficiaries regard themselves and are regarded as the victims of wrongful conduct, where their protection is in part the purpose of the legislation-and provides for remedial redress, the individuals should be heard as of right.... The impact of the proposition diminishes as the class of beneficiaries becomes broader, undifferentiated, unidentifiable, in short as the class approaches the "general public"; so also as the administrative action is apprehended not as a remedy for a wrong but as approaching the norm of legislation. Jaffe, supra note 124, at 528. See Albert, supra note 118, at 451-52. 129. 382 U.S. 205 (1965) . That the NLRA creates private rights has been recognized in other cases. In Mine, Mill & Smelter Workers Local 15 v. Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co., 325 U.S. 335, 338-39 (1945) , the court allowed a party who was successful Court held that charged parties who are successful before the Board can intervene as a matter of right in court of appeals review proceedings, so as to " 'avoid unnecessary duplication of proceedings' " and to increase the likelihood of obtaining "'a just result with a minimum of technical requirements.' "130 The Court reached the same result with regard to successful charging parties, rejecting the Board's argument that the charging party has no right of intervention because the NLRA creates no private rights. 13 1 The Court held that the charging party may have vital "private rights" in the Board proceedings and recognized that the NLRA weaves "private" and "public" interests together in an "intricate statutory scheme."' 132 Scofield and subsequent cases recognizing the existence of "private rights" under the NLRA undercut the argument that charging parties have no protected legal interests.1 33 While continuing to use the language of "private" and "public" rights, courts have recognized that these categories are not mutually exclusive. As Chief Justice Warren stated in Scofield, "[t]o employ the rhetoric of 'public interest' . . . is not to imply that the public right excludes recognition of parochial private interests."' 34 The various "private rights" recognized in the cases are all derived from the basic right to be protected against unfair labor practices. Clearly, a charging party challenging the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint seeks to vindicate this basic right and thereby asserts a claim that falls within the "zone of interests" protected by the NLRA.
before the Board to petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, even though the Board had elected not to seek review. More recently, private rights have been recognized in cases allowing private parties to intervene in proceedings in courts of appeals, see pp. 1376-77 supra, and in cases reviewing both formal and informal settlement orders, see p. 1364 supra.
130. 382 U.S. at 212. 131. Id. at 218-22. 132. Id. at 220. The right to intervene in appellate review proceedings is not unrelated to the right to seek judicial review of an administrative refusal to initiate the administrative process. In Trbovich v. UMW, 404 U.S. 528 (1972) , parties complaining of union election violations were allowed to intervene in suits filed by the Secretary of Labor to set aside those elections under Title IV of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1970) . Subsequently, in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975) , the Court relied upon Trbovich in holding that the complainant could obtain judicial review of the Secretary's decision not to file a suit. Id. at 569-70.
133. See, e.g., Concrete Materials of Ga., Inc. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 61, 67 (5th Cir. 1971): " [T] he General Counsel represents the public interest in preventing the interference to interstate commerce caused by unfair labor practices, and, at the same time, the private interest of the charging party to be free from the harm to his interests caused by unfair labor practices." Cf. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 570, 572 (1975) (Secretary of Labor as "lawyer" representing private interest in Title IV of LMRDA has duty to private parties, enforceable through judicial review of decisions not to bring suit).
134. 382 U.S. at 218.
Reviewability
Once a party has established his standing to challenge agency action, he is presumptively entitled to judicial review. 13 5 On the other hand, the APA provides for two exceptions to this rule: review will be unavailable to the extent that "statutes preclude judicial review" and to the extent that "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law."' 36 The NLRA does not on its face preclude review. Thus any justification for the courts' unwillingness to review the General Counsel's decisions not to issue complaints must rest on some form of the argument that such actions are committed to the General Counsel's discretion by law. Usually one of two propositions is advanced: either that Congress vested the General Counsel with unreviewable "prosecutorial discretion"' 137 or that the statutory scheme immunizes the Gen- Another rationale for nonreviewability, closely related to prosecutorial discretion, is the "final order" doctrine. NLRA § 10(f), 29 U.S.C. § 160(o (1970), makes reviewable "a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought." Some courts have held that the refusal to issue a complaint is not reviewable because it is a preliminary prosecutorial decision and not a "final adjudication" of the Board granting or denying the relief sought. Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 295 F.2d 526 (3d Cir. Moreover, none of the policies underlying the final order doctrine militates in favor of precluding review of the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint. There is no risk of premature intervention into the administrative process before the agency has had the opportunity to formulate its position fully, since the General Counsel's determination is final for administrative purposes. Nor are the procedures producing the General Counsel's decision too informal to allow meaningful review. The charging party is furnished with reasons for the refusal to issue a complaint; he may appeal an adverse decision to the General Counsel's office in Washington. Since the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint fully disposes of the merits and is sufficiently formal to allow review, there should be judicial review of that decision. See JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 31, at 358-59: "[A]bsent a clear intention to eral Counsel's decision as one of expert administrative discretion and judgment.1s Neither argument is compelling. A conclusion that the General Counsel's decisions are unreviewable is not supported by the legislative history of § 3(d),' 13 9 the case law narrowing the exceptions to judicial review, or the Supreme Court's oft-repeated admonition that "only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review."t 0
a. Prosecutorial Discretion
It can be argued that Congress patterned the General Counsel's office and duties on those of a public prosecutor and thereby vested the General Counsel with unreviewable "prosecutorial discretion."' 141 The argument, like the public rights/private rights distinction, rests upon an analogy between criminal courts and administrative agencies. Owing to the large number of crimes and the scarcity of money and manpower, public prosecutors must have considerable discretion in deciding which cases to bring to trial, which to ignore, and which to plea bargain. Because of the dearth of regulations and clear statutory standards governing criminal prosecutions, and because of the countexclude review, an action which finally denies all relief should be construed as a statutory 'order' or, if this is not possible, should be within the general jurisdiction of the district court." As Professor Jaffe suggests, even if the circuit courts do not find that a refusal to issue a complaint is a final order under § 10(f), there is ample precedent 139. The legislative history of § 3(d) indicates that Congress gave no thought to the availability of judicial review. See pp. 1353-56 supra. Upon a similar finding, the Supreme Court in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975) , approved judicial review of the Secretary of Labor's refusal to initiate a union election suit because there was no "showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' that Congress meant to prohibit" review. Id. at 568. Indeed, the Court based its conclusion on the express finding that Congress gave no "thought to the matter of the preclusion of judicial review." Id. at 567.
140. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967 ) (cited in Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975 , and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) The "prosecutorial discretion" exercised by the General Counsel, however, is narrowly confined and therefore insufficient to render review of his decisions wholly impracticable. Unlike a criminal prosecutor, for example, the General Counsel has limited capacity to cite budgetary or manpower considerations as valid reasons for failing to bring a case before the Board. 143 More importantly, the General Counsel and his subordinates are given much clearer statutory guidelines concerning the investigation of cases than is the typical public prosecutor. NLRA § § 10 (1) 14 4 and (m) 1 1 give investigative priority to specified unfair labor practice charges, and § 10(l) directs the Regional Attorney to petition for injunctive relief if he has reasonable cause to believe certain types of violations have occurred. 143. The proviso to NLRA § 14(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1970), states that "[tihe Board'shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959." This proviso would prohibit the NLRB from using budgetary or manpower constraints as justifications for declining to exercise jurisdiction if such declination were inconsistent with pre-1959 jurisdictional standards. Since Congress precluded the Board from declining jurisdiction for budgetary reasons, it is hardly credible that Congress left the General Counsel free to refuse to issue a complaint for such reasons. This conclusion is strengthened by NLRA § 14(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (2) (1970) . Under that section, state labor agencies are permitted to take jurisdiction of labor disputes over which the NLRB has declined jurisdiction. Section 14(c)(2) was enacted in response to Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957), which created a "no-man's land" wherein the Board could decline to act, yet state jurisdiction was preempted. Since § 14(c) (2) is only effective to give the states jurisdiction when the Board declines it, any ad hoc jurisdictional standards applied by the General Counsel in refusing to file a complaint would recreate the problem that § 14(c)(2) was meant to cure: a wrong without a remedy.
144. 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1970) (mandating investigative priority for charges of secondary boycotts and certain recognition strikes).
145. Id. § 160(m) (1970) (mandating investigative priority, except for cases given priority under subsection (/), for charges of employment discrimination on account of union membership or nonmembership).
146. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (1970) (directing Regional Attorney to file for appropriate injunctive relief after lie has reasonable cause to believe complaint should issue) with id. § 160(j) (no requirement that Regional Attorney seek injunction for stated violations).
intent. 4 7 Moreover, unlike the public prosecutor, the General Counsel does not operate in the context of a long tradition which recognizes as relevant to the prosecutorial decision factors other than the likelihood of proving a statutory violation.
148
Not only are the guidelines governing the General Counsel's decisions stricter than those governing the decisions of a public prosecutor, but the institutional structure in which the General Counsel operates precludes analogy to a district attorney. The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the analogy in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
1 4 9 The Court noted that the General Counsel, unlike most public prosecutors, may initiate proceedings only if a private citizen files a charge.
1 5° Unlike the victim of a crime, the charging party becomes a party to the NLRB proceedings if a complaint is filed.lal And if an unfair labor practice is found to exist, the ensuing cease and desist order will, unlike the punishment of a defendant in a criminal case, redound specifically to the benefit of the charging party. 1 52 Another difference, not mentioned by the Court, is that victims of an unfair labor practice 147. No less disturbing than the possibility that the General Counsel will formulate a policy inconsistent with the statutory scheme in deciding what cases to bring is the possibility that he will follow no policy at all. The NLRB FIELD MANUAL (rev. ed. 1971), issued by the General Counsel to guide Regional Directors, contains no rules or statements of policy regarding issuance of complaints.
The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck 9-Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975) , may have provided the General Counsel with an incentive to promulgate more definite guidelines for decisionmaking. In that case, the Court held that private parties should have access to Advice and Appeals Memoranda in which the General Counsel has taken the position that a complaint should not issue. Because inconsistency with prior administrative caselaw is a possible ground for overturning administrative decisions, the availability of the Advice and Appeals Memoranda, coupled with judicial review, might force the General Counsel to develop standards. See DAvis TREATISE SUPP., supra note 21, at 981-82.
148. In the congressional debates concerning the creation of the General Counsel's office, there is no mention of factors that should enter into his decision not to issue a complaint other than inability to prove a violation. See, e.g., 96 CONG. REC. 3694 (1950) (Rep. Hoffman) 
b. Agency Discretion
Closely related to the preclusion of review of prosecutorial discretion 6 1 is the argument that the General Counsel's decisions are "com-mitted to agency discretion by law."' 16 2 The NLRA contains no language specifically committing to the General Counsel's discretion the decision not to issue a complaint. Nevertheless, this exception to judicial review may be inferred if the relevant statutory language is so broad as to provide a reviewing court with no standards to apply, 163 or if judicial review would be so intrusive as to disrupt the administrative process contemplated by the statute."', The Supreme Court, however, has described this exception to the rule of judicial review as "very narrow."' '1 3 Examination of the available statutory standards and the administrative structure of the General Counsel's office indicates that the exception should not be invoked here.
As noted above, the legislative history of § 3(d) evinces no congressional intent to give the General Counsel unbridled discretion over the issuance of complaints;' 0 6 what is more, Congress provided standards in the statute to rein his discretion.
167 Even in the absence of explicit provisions such as those in the NLRA, the courts have been able to discover clear guidelines through resourceful statutory in-terpretation.' 68 Indeed, the clarity that is held to be a precondition of review has often been largely a judicial creation. In Bachowski v. Brennan, 1 9 for example, the Third Circuit decided that the language of LMRDA § 402(b) 170 requires the Secretary of Labor to bring a union election suit whenever he finds a member's complaint meritorious; this finding, said the Court, entails a "rather straightforward factual determination. "' 171 In Adams v. Richardson, 72 the Court inferred standards for review from the precision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in detailing specific enforcement procedures.' 73 Furthermore, judicial review of the General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint would not involve judicial interference with expert judgments that Congress meant to be in the exclusive province of an administrative agency. First, the Board, not the General Counsel, is charged with expert policymaking under the Act. This policymaking function has always been exercised in conjunction with reviewing courts. Secondly, courts reviewing the General Counsel's decisions need not-indeed should not-decide whether a violation of the statute has occurred. Even if a court compels the issuance of a complaint, the Board retains primary jurisdiction to decide its merits. Review of the General Counsel's decision would focus instead on questions within the peculiar expertise of courts: (1) Are the General Counsel's reasons for not issuing the complaint clear and precise? (2) Are his reasons consistent with the NLRA, Board and court precedents, and the General Counsel's own past policies? (3) Does the General Counsel's refusal rest on a legal theory that the Board needs to address in order to clarify the labor law?' 4 168. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v 70 There is no reason for reaching a different conclusion with respect to the General Counsel.
IV. Effective Judicial Scrutiny: Scope and Standards of Review
Having concluded that the General Counsel's decision not to issue a complaint is reviewable, a court must determine the appropriate scope of review. At a minimum, the reviewing court must examine the General Counsel's reasons for his decision in order to ascertain that the decision has an articulated basis. Beyond this, the court should analyze the reasons statement to determine whether the decision is "arbitrary or capricious," or in excess of the General Counsel's statutory authority. If the court remands for additional reasons and the General Counsel fails to take appropriate action or to justify his inaction, judicial review can be effective only if the reviewing court is empowered to compel issuance of a complaint.
A. Review of Reasons Statement
Although there is no formal agency record for the reviewing court to examine, it can require the General Counsel to provide the charging party with a statement outlining the reasons for his action and refused to do so on the grounds that they had been filed too late. The Court held it had the power to compel investigation because its order dealt only with a preliminary question, not with whether a complaint should issue, and because the interpretation of the time limit for filing complaints under NLRA § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970) 177 The least intrusive form of judicial review demands that the court scrutinize the reasons statement to ensure that it sufficiently discloses the facts, policies, and statutory provisions on which the General Counsel has relied. Under this form of review, a court may remand the statement to the agency if it finds that the agency "has not sufficiently rationalized its action or has used irrelevant or failed to use relevant standards of judgment."' 7 8 By requiring the General Counsel to explain inconsistencies or departures from earlier policy and to reconsider inadequately articulated decisions, courts can ensure that the General Counsel develops consistent standards to govern his discretion.
179 Judicial scrutiny will protect against careless actions by assuring that crucial facts and legal concepts are considered, 1 8 0 and will direct political and administrative attention to the policy considerations that may have influenced the General Counsel's judgment. Currently there is little congressional awareness of how the General Counsel interprets the NLRA. Greater familiarity with his interpretations would facilitate congressional oversight of his policy choices and could lead to statutory clarification where necessary.' 8 ' The Board may be little better informed on this score than Congress;' 8 2 were it better informed, the Board might be tempted to reassert its policymaking authority by utilizing its rulemaking power.' 8 3 Beyond requiring the General Counsel to provide detailed reasons for not issuing a complaint, courts may review his reasons statements under the APA to determine if he has exceeded his statutory authority 8 4 or if his decision constitutes an abuse of discretion, i.e., is "arbitrary and capricious."' 18 5 The first task of a reviewing court is to define the ambit of the administrator's authority and discretion under the statute." 6 As a rule, the General Counsel should issue a complaint The reviewing court shall-(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be-(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law .... The "arbitrary and capricious" standard is the basic formula for review of informal agency action, i.e., action for which the APA requires no formal hearing and record. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 140, 142 (1973) ; Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414-16 (1971) . Cf. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 566 (1975) ("arbitrary and capricious" standard appropriate for review of Secretary of Labor's decision not to file suit to set aside union election).
It is clear that a formulaic description of the standard of review does not necessarily determine the intensity of the review undertaken. See 4 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATIsE 118 (1958) . Occasionally review may be given an especially narrow compass in order to prevent the court from substituting its judgment on issues properly left to the administrator. The issues confronting the Secretary of Labor in enforcing Title IV primarily concern inferences about the effects on union elections of conceded irregularities, issues upon which the Secretary can be expected to have substantial experience. Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140 (1964) . Accordingly, review has been limited to an examination of the Secretary of Labor's reasons statement to determine whether his decision was reached "for an impermissible reason or for no reason at all." Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 571-74 (1975) . In contrast, the General Counsel's decisions frequently involve legal issues within the traditional ambit of judicial expertise and thus judicial scrutiny should be more intense. Moreover, the especially limited scope of review in Bachowski was dictated by the special time pressures in Title IV suits resulting from a congressional mandate to settle union election disputes "as quickly as practicable." Id. at 573.
186. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971) . Cf. Safir v. Gibson, 417 F.2d 972, 976 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970) (" 'Discretion . . . is not self defining; it does not arise parthenogenetically from 'broad' phrases. Its contour is determined by the courts, which must define its scope and its limit' ") (quoting JUDICIAL CONTROL, supra note 31, at 572). whenever the facts arguably constitute an unfair labor practice.' 8 7 The Act and its legislative history, decisions of the Board and courts, and the General Counsel's own past policy' 88 provide objective standards for making this determination. Specific statutory restrictions, for example, limit the Board's power to decline jurisdiction over parties on the grounds the business involved is too small to warrant attention;' 8 9 for this reason, courts should refuse to countenance a similar justification for the General Counsel's declining to proceed. Similarly, one may infer from cases involving review of informal settlement orders that a purpose to effect a quick end to tensions between parties is not a valid reason for refusing to issue a complaint when an unremedied violation of the Act has occurred.' 00 When courts can enunciate standards to govern an administrator's discretion, the "scope of authority" and "arbitrary and capricious" formulae have real bite. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, ' 9 ' for example, the Court found clear standards in § 4(f) of the Transportation Act of 1966,192 which prohibits the authorization of funds to finance construction of highways through parks where a "feasible" and "prudent" alternative route exists. Rejecting the Secretary of Transportation's argument that the statute required the discretionary balancing of many factors, the Court held that authorization is permitted only where "as a matter of sound engineering it would not be feasible to build the highway along any other route."' u 3 Although the Secretary's decision was entitled to a presumption of regularity, that presumption could not operate to shield his determination from a "thorough, probing, and in-depth review."' 94 187. See note 148 supra. There may be some reasons, apart from a determination that no unfair labor practice has occurred, for a refusal to issue a complaint. Deference to a completed or ongoing arbitration proceeding might be such a reason . See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 830, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 To say that judicial review of the General Counsel's decisions should be incisive, however, is not to suggest that it will be boundless. The General Counsel's refusal to issue a complaint is informal agency action, i.e., action without an adjudicative hearing. Hence, courts will not review the General Counsel's statement to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence, nor will they conduct a de novo factual inquiry. 1 5 The General Counsel's findings of fact, in other words, will be binding on the reviewing court.' 96 This will pose no problem, since a primary purpose of judicial review will be to encourage the General Counsel to develop new areas of law for the Board's consideration. 
B. Compelling the Issuance of a Complaint
If a court finds the General Counsel's reasons statement inadequate, it may remand for appropriate action. In the rare case in which the General Counsel subsequently fails to issue a complaint or to supply the court with suitable reasons for not doing so, effective judicial review requires that the court be able to compel the General Counsel to proceed.
In 140-42 (1973) (Comptroller of the Currency's decision, not based on formal agency action or hearing, is reviewable only under "arbitrary and capricious" standard, not reviewable under "substantial evidence" standard, and reviewing court may undertake no de novo factual inquiry).
196. But see Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 574 (1975) 197. See pp. 1361-71 supra. Distinctions between law and fact, of course, may not always be clear, and the General Counsel's classification does not bind a reviewing court. For example, in an unfair labor practice case involving employer activity before a union representation election, the General Counsel may conclude that sufficient evidence of a violation does not exist. This apparently factual determination may implicate one of two different findings: (1) the alleged activities never occurred, or (2) the actions did occur but had no effect on the election. In the latter event, the case is perhaps one for the Board, for the Board may derive from the statute a per se rule against certain employer actions. The General Counsel's failure to issue a complaint based upon the second type of "factual" determination could thus be erroneous as a matter of law. Cf. Bachowski v. Brennan, 413 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Pa.) , appeal dismissed, 545 F.2d 363 (3d Cir. 1976) (distinguishing between Secretary of Labor's findings of union election irregularities and his inferences as to what effect those irregularities may have had on the election's outcome).
198. 421 U.S. 560 (1975) .
bring suit in a union election case.' 0 9 Those objections, both statutory and constitutional, apply with considerably less force to the General Counsel. The statutory issue raised in Bachowski was whether "the strong evidence that Congress deliberately gave exclusive enforcement authority to the Secretary" precluded a court from ordering him to bring suit.
2 00 In contrast, the broad policymaking and exclusive enforcement authority under the NLRA is vested in the Board; the General Counsel's discretion is limited to determining whether the Board will probably take jurisdiction to adjudicate a particular controversy. The major constitutional issue raised in Bachowski was whether "Articles II and III . . . 'countenance a court order requiring the executive branch, against its wishes, to institute a lawsuit in federal court.' "201 The General Counsel's decision whether to issue a complaint, however, is merely the first step in an agency process; by compelling the General Counsel to initiate that process, a court would not usurp the Board's enforcement authority, nor would it dictate to the Board what result it must reach.
Ample precedent exists for compelling the issuance of a complaint. Courts in numerous cases have ordered agency action analogous to the General Counsel's issuance of a complaint. . See generally Note, supra note 159, at 900-03 (arguing that Secretary's broad statutory discretion and notions of separation of powers preclude courts from compelling Secretary to bring suit). In a separate opinion, Justice Rehnquist forcefully asserted that the majority's logic presupposed an affirmative answer to that question. 421 U.S. at 592 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part). Indeed, the majority's adjuration to lower courts that they "must be mindful ... that endless litigation concerning the sufficiency of the [Secretary's reasons] statement is inconsistent with the statute's goal of expeditious resolution of post-election disputes," id. at 574-75, could be taken to indicate that a court should compel suit if the Secretary showed himself incapable of producing an adequate statement of reasons.
200. Id. at 575. 201. Id. at 575 n.12. Cf. Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676, 679 nn.18 & 19 (D.C. Cir. 1974 ) (judicial usurpation of prosecutor's "executive function of deciding whether a particular alleged violator should be prosecuted" contravenes "Art. II, § 3 of the Constitution, which charges the President to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed' ").
A second constitutional argument urged in Bachowski was that a judicially compelled lawsuit would lack " 'the requisite adversity of interest to constitute a "case" or "controversy" as required by Article III,'" inasmuch as the Secretary and union would agree that no new election was required. 421 U.S. at 575 n.12. This argument has no relevance to the issue of compelling the General Counsel to initiate proceedings before the Board, since the Board is not an Article III court and is subject to no "case" or "controversy" requirement.
202. Cf. APA § 10(e) Co. v. Solien, 20 9 suggests that a Regional Director can be compelled to seek an injunction in an unfair labor practice case under NLRA § 10(l).210 Judicial power to compel a complaint is necessary if judicial review of the General Counsel is to be effective. 21 ' First, it is possible that the General Counsel, regarding his original decision as valid and wellconsidered, may respond to successive remands by providing successive post hoc rationalizations in a protracted struggle to uphold his posi-tion. Such a stalemate would undermine judicial review and discourage litigants from testing the General Counsel's decisions.
212
More importantly, there may be cases in which the General Counsel has given a reasonable statutory interpretation on an issue for which precedent is slight or conflicting. Since the absence of a statutory violation is an adequate ground for refusing to issue a complaint and the court cannot say that the General Counsel's interpretation is clearly wrong, a remand serves no purpose. Yet to affirm the General Counsel's decisions whenever they are arguably correct is to make him the final arbiter of the NLRA when new issues arise. To protect the NLRB's policymaking authority, the reviewing court must be allowed to overturn the General Counsel's refusal to bring new issues before the Board. 213 The importance of preserving the Board's policymaking authority, -2 14 of course, does not require the issuance of a complaint whenever the legal rule applied by the General Counsel is "arguably" inapposite. Otherwise, the General Counsel would serve no screening function at all. The factors that should enter into a court's decision to compel issuance of a complaint resemble those that govern the Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari. A reviewing court should consider 212. Cf. Trailways of New England, Inc. v. CAB, 412 F.2d 926 (Ist Cir. 1969) (rather than remanding the case, court ordered the CAB to conduct the investigation that complainant requested).
213. Obviously, it is harder to overrule arguably correct statutory interpretations by the General Counsel under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review than to overturn a decision predicated on factors inconsistent with his prior handling of charges or patently at odds with current law. The rationale for requiring the General Counsel to bring important new issues before the Board parallels the view expressed by Learned Hand in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d 785, 789 (2d Cir. 1946) : [T] he position of a public officer, charged with the enforcement of a law, is different from one who must decide a dispute. If there is a fair doubt, his duty is to present the case for the side which he represents, and leave decision to the court, or the administrative tribunal, upon which lies the responsibility of decision. If he surrenders a plausible construction, it will, at least it may, be surrendered forever; and yet it might be right. In Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers Local 100, 483 F.2d 1154 , 1175 (5th Cir. 1973 , rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) , the court warned that repeated attempts by an administrative body to avoid resolution of a difficult issue may constitute an abuse of discretion. For discussion of the Connell litigation, see p. 1365 supra.
214. One indication of Congress's desire to preserve the Board's policymaking functions is its rejection of Reorganization Plan No. 5 in 1961. The Plan would have made the hearing examiner's decision final unless two Board members voted to hear the case. Congress rejected the Plan because it feared that the Plan would remove important decisions from the hands of those to whom Congress had expressly delegated policymaking authority. See 107 CONG. REC. 10223 (1961) (Senator Dirksen); Pepsi-Cola Buffalo Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 676, 680-81 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969) .
